25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Director of Secret L 6 Central Intelligence Libya's Qadhafi: The Challenge to US and Western Interests Special National Intelligence Estimate a Secret SNIE 36.5-85 March 1985 Copy 3 5 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 SNIE 36.5-85 LIBYA'S QADHAFI: THE CHALLENGE TO US AND. WESTERN INTERESTS Information available as of 28 February 1985 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also Participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 SCOPE NOTE Diplomatic and other foreign policy initiatives undertaken by Libyan leader Qadhafi over the past few years suggest a greater focus on undermining US interests. This Estimate addresses policies Qadhafi is likely to pursue over the next 18 months, threats those policies will pose to other states-both regionally and around the world-and their impact on US interests. It also assesses Qadhafi's personality and motivations, his susceptibility and reaction to external pressure, and his relationship to the USSR and other radical states. Hi SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET CONTENTS Page SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... iii KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7 Character of Qadhafi's Foreign Involvement ................................. 7 Libyan Capabilities and Constraints ............................................... 8 Qadhafi's Military Reach .............................................................. 8 The Economic Factor ................................................................... 11 Political Capabilities ..................................................................... 12 Libyan Diplomatic Style .............................................................. 12 Qadhafi's Allies .................................................................................. 13 The USSR ...................................................................................... 13 Third World Radicals ................................................................... 14 The Libyan Threat ........................................................................... 15 Targets in the Middle East and North Africa ............................ 16 Targets in Sub-Saharan Africa ..................................................... 19 Targets in Central America and the Caribbean ......................... 20 Targets in Asia and Oceania ........................................................ 20 Qadhafi's Prospects ........................................................................... 20 Some Recent Successes ................................................................. 20 Negative Prospects ........................................................................ 21 What Could Blunt Qadhafi's Efforts ............................................... 21 Qadhafi's Opponents: Limited Strength but Growing Support 22 Inept Operatives ........................................................................... 22 Implications for the United States ................................................... 22 ANNEX: Chronology of Libyan Troublemaking, 1980-84 ............... 25 V SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 KEY JUDGMENTS During the past few years, Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi has increasingly identified the United States as a key threat to his regime and as a major obstacle capable of thwarting his ambitions in the region and. beyond.' While Qadhafi's fundamental goals have not changed, he has devoted increasing efforts to trying to counter per- ceived US pressures by moving against US interests on a worldwide basis and by working with other anti-US radical states. Qadhafi has enjoyed considerable success recently in combining anti-US moves with exploitation of diplomatic and political/military opportunities that strengthen his ties to US allies-thereby reducing US influence with those allies on Libyan policy. We believe that Qadhafi in the coming 18 months will continue to pursue a multifaceted policy that could have significant impact on US interests worldwide. We expect him to: - Continue subversion-possibly accompanied by carrot-and-stick efforts at co-option-against such unstable regional states as Chad, Sudan, and Tunisia, where he will continue to have significant impact. - Seek new opportunities for increasing influence within Morocco as long as the Libyan-Moroccan union lasts-influence that Qadhafi will try to exploit when the union ultimately founders and he turns sharply against King Hassan. - Make diplomatic overtures to. West European states designed to play on their desire for potentially lucrative trade with Libya- and to stymie any coordinated US effort to bring pressure to bear on the Qadhafi regime. Pursue common goals with other radical states-particularly Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, or possibly the PDRY (South Yemen)-against US interests globally. '.The Director, Bureau-of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that singling out the United States as the primary focus of Qadhafi's foreign policy confuses his rhetorical priorities with his real ones. Clearly Qadhafi regards the United States as a major obstacle to attainment of his goals. Throughout the text where the primacy of attacking the United States is mentioned, however, it is INR's view that the reader should keep in mind the judgments in paragraphs 46 and 66-that Qadhafi's top agenda item is to destroy his Libyan opponents, both at home and in exile; his second priority is regional dominance. 1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 - Continue support to rebel or dissident movements in pro- Western countries as farflung as the Philippines, New Caledo- nia, Pakistan, and Zaire, where Libyan influence is limited. Qadhafi is also funding leftist opposition political groups in the Western Hemisphere, in countries such as Dominica, St. Lucia, and Costa Rica. Qadhafi believes he has successfully manipulated the disparate interests of several key NATO allies-France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey-to help ensure their continued neutrality toward him. A major objective of Qadhafi's efforts to improve ties to Europe will be to gain access to Western military equipment and spare parts for embargoed US materials. We are particularly concerned about Libya's enhanced 25X1 25X1 military relations with Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Libyan defense agreement with Malta bears watching. Qadhafi's focus on the United States has stemmed partially from his perception of an increasingly hostile US administration determined to limit his reach and to weaken his position. Qadhafi demonstrated his willingness to directly target US personnel and installations in the 1970s-in at least Sudan, Egypt, and Italy-but backed off when he knew the United States had learned of his plans and would retaliate against him. Currently, we believe Qadhafi would directly target US personnel or installations if: - He believed he could get away with the attack without US retaliation. - He believed that the United States was engaged in a direct threat to his person or was actively attempting to overthrow his regime. Qadhafi's success so far in countering US policy toward Libya in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the Arab world will encourage him to take greater risks in his efforts against US interests. He may become more willing to back terrorist operations against US personnel or facilities or to order his armed forces to respond to what he deems "provocative" US military activities near Libya. In any military confrontation with Washington, Qadhafi would cast Libya as a small Arab country victimized by a superpower in an attempt to weaken US influence in the Arab world. Such a posture would meet with very little practical response in Arab capitals, however, except from radical comrades-in-arms. The increasing inclination by Qadhafi to implement operations that cause an international uproar and project an image of Libyan 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 power impacts on the credibility of US economic and security commit- ments. Qadhafi's actions are likely to prompt persistent requests by US friends in Africa and the Arab world for immediate military and economic assistance to lessen their vulnerability to Libyan pressure. Moderate leaders, particularly Arabs, risk discrediting themselves with repeated and desperate calls for US support. By demonstrating their dependence on the United States, they highlight the failure of their economic and security policies and may promote popular opposition to close US ties. Under such circumstances, continued Libyan pressure, mixed with blandishments, could prompt some pro-US governments- such as Sudan and Tunisia-to adopt a more nonaligned posture. Qadhafi's continued disregard for international law and conven- tion-reneging on international agreements, abusing diplomatic privi- lege for terrorist purposes, and blatant use of violence against oppo- nents-undermines international norms of behavior and may, over time, encourage other states or groups to do likewise. The international perception of a gap between US rhetorical criticism of Qadhafi's behavior and actual US policy toward him also undermines US credibility on this issue. European states that have moved to improve ties to Libya have done so mainly for economic reasons. Continued financial dealings with Libya by American companies have raised serious questions from several quarters about the sincerity of US policy toward Libya. The French and Egyptians in particular have publicly emphasized the economic ambiguity in the US relationship with Libya. Qadhafi is strongly driven by fear of the exile movement-which he views as US backed. Qadhafi will devote primary attention to the physical elimination of these enemies and to denying them refuge in any country. Qadhafi's desire for closer relations with European and other Middle Eastern States will be in part influenced by his desire to neutralize Libyan exiles in those countries. Over the last several years, Libya has provided money, weapons, a base of operations, travel assistance, or training to some 30 insurgent, radical, or terrorist groups. Tripoli operates approximately 10 training camps that provide instruction in politics and the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla techniques. Qadhafi's long-range goals have not shifted significantly, despite his increased focus on the United States as the primary external enemy. Qadhafi will continue to seek: - To be a recognized leader of the Arab world. - To strike at Israel. 3 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 - To make Libya the dominant state in North Africa. - To establish Libyan political leadership in black Africa, elimi- nating the French position and influence there. - To spread his vision of Islam as an instrument to rally the oppressed of the Third World against colonialism and imperialism. Essentially, Qadhafi is not controllable. He h .li ve his own 2r cg~nts, and no array of external pressures is likely to alter his policy goals or his will to adventurism. He is independent of real restraint from his close advisers. A fundamental belief in the righteousness of his cause prevents compromise, and his recent foreign policy successes encourage him to stay the course. Increased political and economic pressure have not permanently modified his behavior. Although he may temporarily back down under threat of strong retaliation, opposition enhances his feelings of self-importance and increases his determination to take revenge. Nonetheless, oil production is the mainstay of Libya's economy and the ultimate source of its political and economic influence. The abrupt withdrawal of US oil and service companies from Libya could result in a substantial short-term drop in the country's oil production. Any resulting production decline, however, is likely to be temporary and to inflict only limited hardship on the government because Libya could rely on increasingly skilled domestic personnel and workers from Western Europe and Canada for assistance. Although Libya's oil-derived income has dropped sharply in the last few years because of the soft world oil market, Qadhafi will continue to have sufficient funds to support most of his subversive, terrorist, diplomatic, and political activities. He will be forced, however, to be more selective in providing larger handouts-although even modest sums by Libyan standards can have major impact on impover- ished African and Latin American states. He will continue to provide significant economic support to friendly states under US pressure. Libya greatly values its relationship with the USSR. The massive amounts of weapons Qadhafi has purchased have been supplied overwhelmingly by the Soviets. Tripoli will continue to look to Moscow for many types of sophisticated weaponry that have been denied Libya by Western manufacturers. Soviet technicians keep a large portion of Libya's most sophisticated weapons operable, while Soviet instructors help Libyan operators develop the skills to use the weapons effectively. Qadhafi also seems to hope that his ties to Moscow will offer some protection from the United States. He probably hopes that allowing 4 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Soviet warships and military aircraft to use Libyan facilities since 1981 suggests that he enjoys Soviet protection, although Moscow has scrupu- lously avoided giving him such a commitment. Moscow, for its part, has broadly benefited from its relations with Tripoli, despite occasional complications to Soviet policy from some of Qadhafi's actions. In particular, Qadhafi's efforts to undermine Western interests in various parts of the world generally coincide with the USSR's own aims. Arms sales to Libya remain a major source of hard currency for the Soviets. Mutual distrust inhibits more active Libyan-Soviet cooperation. Senior Soviet officials have frequently expressed frustration with Qadhafi's unpredictability. Both sides, however, appear to believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Moscow can reap the range of benefits it derives from Qadhafi's anti-Western activity around the world while officially remaining uncommitted and distanced from those activities., Tripoli, in turn, can maintain its own independence of action while receiving Soviet arms and security support. Qadhafi is unlikely to "give" facilities to the Soviets-he has long condemned the use of Arab territory for foreign military bases-but he probably hopes that threats to do so will deter Washington from increasing pressure on his regime. If he perceives a growing US threat to Libya, however, he probably would offer Moscow significantly increased access to Libyan facilities, possibly including use of the large Soviet-built Al Jufra fighter/bomber base now nearing completion. Qadhafi today is at least as dangerous as he has ever been and is, in some ways, a more formidable actor on the international stage. His primary long-range goal-to become the preeminent leader of the Arab world-continues to elude him. The passage of time has not diminished his urgency to accomplish his goals, despite his having faced the reality that he will not achieve them quickly. With the years, Qadhafi has become more calculating in blending political skills with tactics of terrorism and intimidation as he shrewdly exploits opportunities. Re- cently, Qadhafi has scored some significant successes that lead him to believe he is winning greater international acceptance. Although he will not be satisfied until he achieves his ultimate objectives, these successes have bolstered his self-confidence and spur him on to further-and potentially more dangerous-adventurism. Over the past six months-and extending back several years- Qadhafi has managed to put together a broadly conceived worldwide range of activities that suggest a kind of knowledge and vision unlikely to spring entirely from Qadhafi personally. There is a considerable gap in our knowledge of the group around Qadhafi which assists in the 5 SECRET. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 conception, planning, and execution of this broad range of international contacts requiring a relatively detailed grasp of worldwide operational intelligence. The US Intelligence Community needs to consider the sources of influence and advice to Qadhafi that enable him. to draft and pursue his policies-including the possibility of policy-planning assis- tance from other radical states or the Soviet Bloc. Qadhafi's continued adventurism-whether driven by frustration or the momentum of success-could ultimately bring about his down- fall. In several key areas, Qadhafi may overreach himself, possibly triggering more concerted external opposition against him. Further actions against Egypt, for example, would dramatically increase the risk of decisive retaliation from Cairo. A blatant military failure could prompt a move against Qadhafi by his own forces. Moreover, his lawless behavior has already increased the inclination of several states to sponsor Libyan dissidents. 6 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET DISCUSSION Character of Qadhafi's Foreign Involvement 1. Libyan leader Qadhafi has been determined to play a leading role in eliminating Western political influence in the Third World ever since he seized power 15 years ago. He sees himself as a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder both Libyan society and Third World politics. His vision provides both a motive and a rationale for providing military and financial aid to radical regimes, and for under- mining moderate governments by supporting-or cre- ating-subversive groups and on occasion. abetting international terrorists. His deep-rooted sense of mis- sion and hostility to what he regards as Western "imperialism" are heavily influenced by Libya's lega- cy of bitter and brutal colonization by Italy. 2. Qadhafi's radical worldview and self-image are shaping his determination to pursue several overriding and sometimes interrelated objectives: - Dividing the United States from its allies on policy toward Libya. Qadhafi's efforts to im- prove relations with Western Europe, his union agreement with Morocco, and sporadic political overtures to Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia support this goal. - Promoting a more unified and militant Muslim posture toward Israel and asserting his leadership in the Arab world. Actions undertaken in pursuit of this objective include: ? Continuing political and military support for Iran and Syria. ? Financial aid and arms shipments to Lebanese leftists and radical Palestinian groups. ? Participation by small numbers of Libyan troops in Lebanon in Syrian-led fighting that drove PLO Chairman Arafat from Tripoli in late 1983. - Undermining moderate, pro-Western regimes in the region. Examples include: ? The aerial bombing in March 1984 of a radio station near Khartoum, Sudan, and the mining of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez in July 1984. ? Increased support for subversion in Sudan, So- malia, and Zaire (the first black African state to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel). Eliminating the threat from Libyan dissidents at home and in exile. Examples of Qadhafi's deter- mination to end opposition activity include: ? His intense security crackdown following the abortive May 1984 coup attempt. ? Libyan pressure on West Europeans and on moderate Arabs such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia to return dissidents to Tripoli. ? The renewed campaign to kill Libyan exiles in Europe in 1984. ? Libyan attempts to smuggle weapons and explo- sives into Saudi Arabia for use against Libyan dissidents during the 1984 Muslim pilgrimage. - Establishing Libyan political leadership in Africa and eradicating French influence and presence there. Qadhafi has pursued this objective by: ? Plotting against Chadian President Habre and reneging on his agreement with France to with- draw from northern Chad last November. ? Making political overtures designed to exploit growing uncertainties in West Africa over French security commitments. - Strengthening fellow radicals under US pressure. Libyan political, military, and economic support for Nicaragua is an example of Qadhafi's pursuit of this objective. 3. Qadhafi's actions during the past two years have been heavily focused on undermining US and, to a lesser extent, French interests and policies-the princi- pal impediments to his broader aims. At the root of his longstanding hostility toward the United States is 7 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Washington's support of Israel and his view of the United States as the center of world imperialism. Qadhafi also perceives US influence over moderate Arab regimes as precluding any hope of uniting the Arabs in a more militant stand against Israel-one of his most cherished objectives. Qadhafi's opposition to France, on the other hand, stems largely from his belief that French political predominance in France's former African colonies is thwarting his ambitions for regional leadership. 4. Qadhafi's longstanding antagonism toward Washington has developed into a personal hatred of the current US administration. He is particularly concerned about what he regards as Washington's acute lack of consideration for Arab concerns and its militant posture toward Libya and other radicals around the world. A number of factors influence Qadhafi's assessment: - Public US condemnation of his regime and US attempts to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against it. - The shootdown of two Libyan fighter aircraft by US pilots in 1981 and the continuing US military challenge to Libya's territorial claims over the Gulf of Sidra. - Washington's continuing rebuff of unpublicized Libyan political overtures. - US intervention in Egypt and Sudan to thwart his threats to those countries. - Washington's campaign to deprive Qadhafi of the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1982 and 1983. - US opposition to the radical Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. - US military intervention in Grenada. 5. Qadhafi also believes that Washington is working toward his removal. A series of security incidents in Libya, beginning in late 1983 and culminating in the unsuccessful attack on his headquarters last May, has heightened Qadhafi's fears that Libyan exiles will exploit rising popular discontent in Libya. Qadhafi views the exiles as the tools of the United States and the moderate Arabs, and his fear of the exiles is out of proportion to their capability to topple him. Libyan Capabilities and Constraints 6. Qadhafi's pursuit of his immediate objectives is accompanied by a more realistic sense of how he can use Libya's limited political and military capabilities and financial resources. His reappraisal almost certain- ly stems in part from his long list of past foreign policy failures. His difficulty in creating viable political unions (the union with Morocco in August 1984 was at King Hassan's initiative), his failure to become OAU chairman in June 1983, and strong US opposition have given Qadhafi a greater appreciation of the political constraints he faces. In addition, his disastrous military adventure in Uganda in 1979 underscored the.inability of Libyan forces to project a sustained military pres- ence beyond the country's contiguous neighbors. Fi- nally, Qadhafi's unsuccessful efforts to translate finan- cial aid into lasting political influence in most regions or to promote revolutions by dispensing money to subversive groups have encouraged him to give greater focus to how he uses Libya's declining financial resources. Qadhafi's Military Reach 7. Libya is marginally capable of projecting mili- tary force beyond its immediate neighbors. Training, manning, and maintenance limitations preclude pro- jecting a major Libyan presence farther away than Chad or Niger. Qadhafi, however, can use his limited air or naval assets to disrupt, embarrass, or intimidate Third World countries in the region. (See map on page 10.) Physical damage caused in most of these attacks, barring a lucky hit, would be slight, but Qadhafi almost certainly would use them to underscore his opponent's military vulnerability. 8. Several assets are available to Qadhafi for strikes well beyond Libya's borders: - TU-22 bombers. These aircraft have a combat radius of over 1,500 nautical miles and can reach into central Africa, Southwest Asia, and Europe. A pair of TU-22s, conducting a surprise attack, could inflict considerable damage on a target of opportunity. Finding and destroying a selected target-such as an embassy or a dam-are prob- ably beyond the capabilities of Libya's TU-22 crews, however. The Libyan TU-22 that struck Omdurman, Sudan, in 1984 failed to seriously damage the designated target-a large radio and TV station-because of poor crew training and a lack of guided munitions. -Naval mines. Libyan (or Libyan-chartered) mer- chant ships could plant mines covertly in shallow maritime chokepoints anywhere in the world. A single ship could sow 100 or so mines with little difficulty if precision were not a prerequisite. Libya's recent mining of the Red Sea and the 8 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Gulf of Suez illustrates the disruptive capacity of such an operation. Libyan submarines, warships, bombers, and transport aircraft could each sow a small number of mines in the Mediterranean but at greater risk and with less effect. - Frogmen. Libyan frogmen could be carried any- where in the world on merchant ships. They are reported to be well trained in underwater demo- lition and long-distance swimming, and could sink moored ships or conduct limited sabotage ashore. - Submarines. Libya's small fleet of F-class subma- rines could covertly deliver small numbers of mines or frogmen nearly anywhere along the Mediterranean littoral. They could also identify and sink a particular ship at anchor. Given their poor state of training, however, Libyan subma- rine crewmen would have only a slim chance of finding and sinking a specific ship on the open seas with torpedoes. - Conventional forces. Except for Chad, Qadhafi has been unwilling to commit a large military force outside Libya since his disastrous interven- tion in Uganda in 1979. He is willing, however, to send a small force-up to 1,400 men-to areas where an ally is willing to host them. A small 9 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Libyan Military Reach on ~ aris* Libya . Khartoum, Sudan Qadhafi's TU-22 bombers and F-class submarines can reach well beyond Libya's borders to disrupt, embarrass, or intimidate, even though they would cause limited damage. Qadhafi could also send merchant ships to plant naval mines or frogmen to sabotage maritime or coastal targets throughout the world. *Addis Ababa 10 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 number of Libyan troops helped Syrian forces drive mainstream PLO units out of northern Lebanon in 1983. The presence of such troops may increase Libyan prestige and influence in a regional conflict, but would rarely affect the military balance. 9. We believe that Qadhafi will use these military assets only for isolated and infrequent attacks. The occasional use of tactics such as the Omdurman bombing or the Red Sea mining offers him an impor- tant element of deniability. Frequent use, however, would increase Libya's vulnerability to exposure and retaliation. 10. The prolonged slump in the international oil market has diminished-but not eliminated-the eco- nomic leverage Qadhafi has in his international deal- ings. The sharp decline in Libya's foreign exchange reserves from $14 billion in 1981 to $3.5 billion in 1985 has made him more aware of the tradeoffs in providing financial assistance, and he has responded by threatening to cut off funds to groups that refuse to adopt a more militant posture toward pro-Western governments and the United States. At the same time, he has come through with sizable amounts of money- over $300 million to Ethiopia and approximately $400 million to Nicaragua-to governments he believes are vulnerable to US economic pressure. 11. Although the Libyan economy faces severe difficulties, it still has a "boom" atmosphere compared with other economies in the region. Libya's potential as a source of hard currency has been instrumental in luring Morocco and several West European govern- ments into improving relations with Tripoli, despite a large backlog of unpaid bills and efforts to barter petroleum in exchange for imports. Should lower oil revenues further restrict Libya's liquidity, however, Qadhafi's access to, and success with, West European governments will diminish. 12. Money is not the only source of economic leverage at Qadhafi's disposal. Approximately 500,000 expatriates currently hold jobs in Libya, mostly as manual laborers. Table 1 shows the approximate num- bers of expatriates, by nationality, in Libya in 1984. Morocco's King Hassan cited the prospect of more jobs. for Moroccans in Libya as an important factor in his willingness. to propose union with Qadhafi. Qadhafi also has used the threat to expel Tunisian and Turkish expatriate workers in an effort to intimidate their governments into responding to his political overtures. Table 1 Expatriates in Libya, 1984 Soviets and East Europeans 70,000 Turks 60,000 South Koreans 18,000 7 25X1 25X1 13. Qadhafi's ability to use access to Libya's high- quality crude oil as a foreign policy tool has been sharply limited. As a result of refinery modernization in Europe and the United States, Libya's oil now accounts for only a small percentage of most consu- mers' oil imports and could be replaced easily. Table 2 indicates the Communist and non-Communist coun- tries purchasing Libyan oil in December 1984.- 14. Qadhafi probably could increase his influence with poorer, Third World countries if he gave them Libyan oil or sold it to them at cut-rate prices, but he has not yet chosen to employ his petroleum resources in this manner as a foreign policy tool. Moreover, in its dealings with Third World governments, Tripoli has established a reputation as an unreliable supplier and for being stingy with price or other financial conces- sions. Qadhafi's ability to use oil as a weapon would increase quickly, however, if supplies from the Persian Gulf were cut off. Libya has 25 percent of available non-Communist excess oil capacity outside the Persian Gulf, and production-currently at 57 percent of sustainable capacity-could be increased in a matter of weeks. 15. Qadhafi also has little leverage in nonoil trade. Table 3 shows trade with Libya by selected non- Communist countries in 1984. Libya accounts for only small percentages of its partners' international trade, with the exception of Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Greece. The Libyan leader, however, has been able to use the prospect of substantial purchases of military hardware to his advantage in dealing with various West European governments. 11 SECRET. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Table 2 Purchasers of Libyan Oil, 1 December 1984 1,000 barrels per day Liftings of Percent of Libyan Oil Purchaser's Oil Imports a The USSR accepts Libyan oil in barter for arms. This oil is shipped directly to Soviet clients in Eastern Europe-primarily Bulgaria and Yugoslavia-and little or no Libyan oil is used domestically in the USSR. b Italy resells about half of its Libyan oil to third parties. 16. Oil is the mainstay of Libya's economy and the ultimate source of its international political and eco- nomic influence. Libya remains vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the international oil market, which alone has taken the greatest toll on` the economy. The regime could face severe financial problems this year if oil prices or exports declined sharply. 17. Four US oil companies still operate.in Libya. Although these firms help to maintain Libya's produc- tive capacity, their withdrawal would not damage operations or hinder long-term oil production. A coordinated trade embargo including West European countries and US subsidiaries' abroad would be neces- sary to significantly reduce Libya's oil production below the current level. 18. The abrupt withdrawal of US oil and service companies could result in a substantial short-term drop in Libyan oil production by as much as 300.000 barrels a day. (A phased withdrawal would be much less successful.) Any resulting production decline. however. would probably be temporary and inflict only limited hardship on the government because Libya could rely on increasingly skilled domestic personnel and workers from Western Europe and Canada for assistance. Much of the foreign labor force of US oil firms operating in Libya probably could be persuaded to remain. Political Capabilities 19. Qadhafi's ability to project political power is based on his military arsenal and oil revenues, and his willingness to use them in support of revolutionary causes. Qadhafi has created for himself a reputation for ruthlessness and for exploiting the domestic vulner- abilities of Third World regimes that will not do his bidding. In general, the intimidating effect of Qadha- fi's will to adventurism diminishes the farther away from Libya he tries to exert his influence. African states feel the most threatened. Qadhafi's ties to local leaders and political groups in South Asia or the Caribbean, on the other hand, are driven more by the prospect of financial assistance than by fear. 20. Qadhafi has limited powers of political persua- sion. His pretensions to be the successor to Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasir as a charismatic leader of non- aligned nations frequently lead him to rely on the strength of his personality alone and to overplay his hand. His abrasive and heavyhanded exhortations and lectures to foreign statesmen generally alienate the very leaders he is trying to court. In the Arab world, certain aspects of his moralizing-particularly on Arab-Israeli issues-strike a responsive chord, and some Arab leaders would feel obliged to give him pro forma support if he were attacked militarily by the United States. Nonetheless, most Arab leaders would greet Qadhafi's demise with relief and pleasure. Libyan Diplomatic Style 21. Qadhafi's ventures into diplomacy are ham- pered by his stranglehold over an inept and misman- aged foreign policy decisionmaking establishment. His personal conduct of foreign policy has rendered it erratic and sometimes ill formed. Visits by foreign dignitaries often are uncoordinated with relevant .agencies. Protocol arrangements frequently are ig- nored. Appointments with Qadhafi are canceled with little notice. Promises of financial aid to foreign governments or dissident groups often go unfulfilled because they were not cleared in advance with Qadha- 12 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET Table 3 Trade With Libya by Selected Non-Communist Countries, 1984 a Exp Lib orts to ya Percent of Exports Imports From Libya b Percent of Imports United States 19 7 0.1 10 NEGL Netherlands 18 5 0.3 330 0.5 Turkey 17 0 2.6 589 5.8 a Estimated. b Virtually all oil. Million US $ (except as indicated) fi, or because he changed his mind or was misunder- stood by his deputies. 22. The situation has been exacerbated since Qa- dhafi dismantled Libya's traditional diplomatic estab- lishment in 1979. The replacing of embassies by "people's bureaus," manned largely by noncareer diplomats, has alienated many governments. Many of the personnel-some little more than thugs-are pro- Qadhafi extremists who share his contempt for diplo- matic procedure. Some appear to have virtually a free hand in dispensing large sums of money and running clandestine operations. Recommendations of the few experienced diplomats still in place are frequently ignored. 23. Qadhafi's appointment of Abd al-Salam al- Turayki, formerly Libya's UN Ambassador, as Foreign Minister in 1984 is slowly improving Libya's tarnished political image in the international community. Tur- ayki has worked assiduously to restore the Foreign Ministry's influence with Qadhafi and to minimize the number of pro-Qadhafi zealots assigned to diplomatic posts abroad. Turayki's broad contacts among diplo- mats throughout the world has made him a key Qadhafi emissary. 24. The Soviet Union's willingness to sell Qadhafi large quantities of weapons-about $15 billion since the early 1970s-provides him with the military wherewithal to pursue his radical objectives. Tripoli continues to look to Moscow for. many types of sophisticated weapons that have been denied Libya by Western manufacturers. Soviet technicians keep many of Libya's most sophisticated weapons operable, while Soviet instructors help Libyan operators develop the skills to use the weapons effectively. 25. Qadhafi probably also believes that a close relationship with Moscow will offer some protection from the United States. He probably hopes that allow- ing Soviet warships and military aircraft to use Libyan facilities since 1981 suggests that he enjoys Soviet protection, although Moscow has scrupulously avoided giving him such a commitment. Qadhafi periodically tries to play the "Soviet card" against the United States-as he did in 1984-by announcing that he might open the Libyan coast to the Soviets and "give" them facilities. 13 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 26. Qadhafi is unlikely to "give" facilities to the Soviets-he has long condemned the use of Arab territory for foreign military bases-but probably hopes that such threats will deter Washington from increasing pressure on his regime. If he perceived a growing external threat to Libya, however, he proba- bly would offer Moscow significantly increased access to Libyan facilities, possibly including use of the large Soviet-built A] Jufra fighter/bomber base now nearing completion. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets have told Qadhafi that they would assist him in a confrontation with the United States. Indeed, Mos- cow has refused to support Libya's claims regarding its "territorial waters" in the Gulf of Sidra. 27. Moscow, for its part, has largely benefited from its relations with Tripoli, although Qadhafi's actions have complicated Soviet policy at times. Qadhafi's efforts to undermine US interests in various parts of the world generally coincide with the USSR's own aims. Examples of Libyan activities that indirectly serve the Soviets by aiding US opponents and threaten- ing US-supported governments include: - Direct military intervention in Chad. - Provision of arms to Sudanese and Somali dissi- dents and to Nicaragua. - Aid to Pakistani terrorists who seek to overthrow President Zia. 28. Moscow also has acquired considerable military and economic benefits from its ties to Tripoli. Soviet- Libyan military cooperation has expanded since the US-Libyan air clash over the Gulf of Sidra, and the Soviets now frequently use Libyan air and naval facilities to monitor US military movements in the eastern Mediterranean. The approximately 50,000 So- viet and East European technicians in Libya earn considerable hard currency that 'supplements the sub- stantial sums their countries earn from selling arms to Tripoli. 29. Nevertheless, the Soviets avoid explicit associa- tion with Qadhafi's adventures and do not always support his regional policies: - Moscow denied a request to help transport Liby- an troops into Chad in 1983. - The USSR, which generally restricts the transfer of its major weapon systems, has cautioned Trip- oli about selling such equipment to Iran for use against another valued Soviet customer, Iraq. - Moscow supports PLO chief Arafat and a negoti- ated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while Qadhafi backs radical Palestinians who reject compromise. - The Soviets probably also are concerned that Libya's union with Morocco will complicate So- viet-Algerian relations. 30. Mutual distrust inhibits more active Libyan- Soviet cooperation. Senior Soviet officials have fre- quently expressed frustration with Qadhafi's unpre- dictability. Both sides, however, appear to believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Moscow can reap the range of benefits it derives from Qadhafi's anti- Western activity around the world while officially remaining uncommitted and distanced from those activities. Tripoli, in turn, can maintain its own inde- pendence of action while receiving Soviet arms and security support. 31. Unlike his ties to Moscow, Qadhafi's links to other radical regimes in the Middle East and else- where in the Third World give him little in terms of economic or military benefits. He clearly values the political support these radicals give him, however, and may feel that such support deters regional moderates from taking action against him. 32. Competing philosophies and egos have limited the extent of cooperation among Third World radicals, and we expect these limitations to continue. We do.not believe, however, that Qadhafi's allies would support him in a confrontation with the United States, beyond providing rhetoric and diplomatic initiatives in inter- national bodies such as the UN. The use of US military force against Libya, however, probably would prompt Qadhafi to press for joint terrorist operations against US interests. 33. Iran. The Iranian regime's anti-US focus is likely to lead to expanded contacts with Libya at the working level, but Qadhafi's role in the disappearance in 1978 of Lebanese Shia leader Musa Sadr while on a trip to Libya, and Tehran's distaste for Qadhafi's ideology, will continue to limit cooperation. There is considerable speculation about Iranian support for Libyan terrorist and intelligence operations, but we do not know if both parties have participated in either the planning or implementation stages. At the same time, the use of Shia terrorism against US facilities and personnel in Lebanon and Kuwait may embolden Qadhafi in the direction of further anti-US plots, and we cannot rule out Tehran's providing some logistic support. 14 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET 34. Syria. Qadhafi has been somewhat more suc- cessful in gaining support from the Syrians. Damascus has provided enough pilots to man a MIG-23 squadron since 1979, when Qadhafi feared he was vulnerable to Egyptian attack and requested such support. This unit is one of the best in the Libyan Air Force and frequently responds to US air and ship movements off the Libyan coast. We believe that Damascus would allow Qadhafi to use these pilots to defend Libyan- claimed territorial rights and airspace in an encounter with US forces. Qadhafi values Syrian political support in international forums and will welcome any efforts by Damascus to upset movement toward peace negoti- ations with Israel by moderate Arabs. 35. Although Tripoli, - Damascus, -and Tehran are talking about increased cooperation against Iraq and Israel, moving from rhetoric to action will be difficult. Neither Qadhafi nor Syrian President Assad wants to see a Shia regime under Tehran's influence emerge in Iraq or in Lebanon. At the same time, Iran and Syria are suspicious of Qadhafi's motives in concluding a union agreement with Morocco last August. 36. Ethiopia. Ethiopia-which formed a Tripartite Alliance with Libya and South Yemen in -August 1981-is of considerable utility to Qadhafi in support- ing subversion against regional moderates. Ethiopia is the main conduit for Libyan arms, equipment, and funds supplied to the Sudanese insurgents, as well as to Somali dissident groups. Libyans based in Addis Ababa probably also have been involved in the onward shipment of weapons in support of terrorist or guerrilla operations elsewhere in Africa. 37. Despite .indications of some unhappiness be- tween Addis Ababa and Tripoli, - we anticipate that Ethiopian leader Mengistu will continue to support Qadhafi's efforts to topple the Sudanese and Somali leaderships and to voice -support for Libyan-backed Chadian dissidents, but- not to become involved in other Libyan initiatives. Libya has already provided Ethiopia over $300 million in foreign exchange, and Addis Ababa does not want to jeopardize promises of an additional $500 million in project assistance. 38. South Yemen. Relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Libya's other partner in the Tripartite Alliance, have deteriorated because of Tripoli's reneging on promised economic aid and meddling in Aden's internal politics. Qadhafi's attempts to convince Aden to reactivate the National Democratic Front against the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and to provide.it with Libyan arms are not likely to be successful at present. How- ever, if hardline ex-President Ismail returns and radi- cal elements again become dominant in the Aden government, Libyan-South Yemeni cooperation could be revived and directed against moderate states of the Arabian Peninsula. 39. North. Korea. Qadhafi's relations with North Korea have been surprisingly active and are based largely on a common desire to undermine US interests. Although the closeness of the ties is difficult to gauge because of serious gaps in information, available evi- dence does suggest that cooperation exists on military and security matters. P'yongyang also may have pro- vided limited support last year for at least one Libyan terrorist plot.- We believe that Qadhafi will continue to seek North Korean assistance in selected instances because such aid is useful in concealing Libyan in- volvement. As many as 100 North Korean military personnel are in Libya, and up to several hundred others are engaged in economic activity. 40. Cuba. Havana probably welcomes Libya's par- ticipation in opposing US interests in Central America and will work with Tripoli to provide military equip- ment and training to radical elements in the region. Beyond these areas, however, cooperation is likely to be limited. Qadhafi and Castro have never developed close personal ties because of their inflated egos and different revolutionary philosophies. Moreover, Havana sees as poorly timed and counterproductive the current Libyan pressure on Caribbean leftists to be more militant. Cuba may believe that violent anti-US activity in the Caribbean will be perceived in Wash- ington as directed from Havana and could prompt a strong US response. The Libyan Threat 41. Although his ambitions well outrun his capabili- ties, Qadhafi's role in fostering terrorism and instabil- ity and in abetting conflicts, even on a regional scale, is one of the most prominent in the world. (See the map on page 17.) The prospect that Qadhafi will use his more refined sense of Libyan capabilities to exploit growing signs of political instability represents a seri- ous threat to some moderate countries near Libya. - 42. Threats, support for terrorism and subversion, offers of military and financial aid, and economic intimidation are the tools of Qadhafi's foreign policy. Qadhafi's choice of tactics at any given time often is impromptu and motivated by opportunism. He almost always mixes his tactics-frequently offering political and economic cooperation to lay the groundwork for renewed subversion. His overtures for closer diplomat- ic and commercial ties to Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and 15 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 several West African states-combined with financial and logistic support of dissidents-exemplify Qadha- fi's approach. 43. Qadhafi demonstrated his willingness to direct- ly target US personnel and installations in the 1970s- in at least Sudan, Egypt, and Italy-but backed off when he knew the United States had learned of the threats and would retaliate against him. Currently, we believe Qadhafi would directly target US personnel or installations if: - He believed he could get away with the attack without US retaliation. He believed that the United States was engaged in a direct threat to his person or was actively attempting to overthrow his regime. 44. Should Qadhafi decide to initiate terrorism against US personnel and facilities directly, US targets abroad will be more vulnerable than those inside the United States and more accessible to Libyan terrorists. Qadhafi would be hard pressed to mount a successful terrorist operation in the United States. The closure of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington four years ago has made direct Libyan recruitment of assassins in the United States difficult. Nonetheless, Qadhafi could still recruit foreigners-as he often does-to carry out operations within the United States. 45. There is no indication of threat to American citizens living in Libya. Qadhafi has treated these persons well to avoid alienating US businesses and to put the lie to Washington's warnings about the dangers of dealing with him. A threat to the US personnel in Libya is not likely unless Qadhafi feels a greatly increased threat from the United States. 46. We believe the Libyan leader will continue to pursue his traditional targets: Libyan dissidents and moderate Arab regimes. Qadhafi's determination to kill the leaders of several of these regimes-Egypt's President Mubarak, Sudan's President Nimeiri, Chad's President Habre, Iraq's President Saddam Husayn, and Jordan's King Hussein-will continue to fuel Libyan terrorism for the period of this Estimate. Libya's generally inept direction of such operations and the-tight security surrounding these leaders when they travel abroad, however, minimize Tripoli's chances of conducting a successful assassination. Libya has had greater success in assassinating opponents of the. Libyan regime, although many have been relative- ly-low-level figures. The embarrassment of the recent- ly foiled attempt to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakush in Egypt will keep both anti-Qadhafi exiles and Egypt at .the top of Qadhafi's hit list. . 47. Libya has the capability to launch a variety of paramilitary and terrorist-style attacks, but its opera- tives are often inept. Qadhafi often prefers to recruit agents abroad or hire mercenaries rather than use Libyan citizens to conduct operations. Libyan diplo- matic missions help oversee operations, distribute cash and weapons, and arrange travel, but the use of surrogates prevails. This trend is likely to continue, as Qadhafi is not eager to have terrorist acts traced directly to Libya, damaging his pretensions of being a responsible Arab statesman. 48. Support for subversive groups is especially ap- pealing to Qadhafi because it usually provides oppor- tunities to train dissidents in Libya and to indoctrinate them in his personal philosophies of revolution. Over the last several. years, Tripoli has provided money, weapons, a base of operations, travel assistance, or training to some 30 insurgent, -radical, or terrorist groups. Libya operates approximately 10 training camps that provide instruction in politics and the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and vari- ous commando-and guerrilla techniques. 49. In the final analysis, those most threatened by Qadhafi. remain those most vulnerable to him: first, the Libyan people themselves, then Libyan dissidents abroad and Libya's weaker neighbors. Because he is determined to eliminate Libyan opposition and those who support it, we can expect to.see increased target- ing of moderate Arab and African interests in coming months. Targets in the Middle East and North Africa 50. Sudan. President Nimeiri's deteriorating politi- cal position makes him the Arab leader most vulnera- ble-to Libyan pressure. Moreover, the Sudanese Presi- dent's support for Egypt and the Camp David accords, his willingness to participate in military exercises with the United States, and his role as a principal backer of Libya's largest dissident organization make him Qad- hafi's principal Arab target. Tripoli is one of the leading sources of arms, funds, training, and logistic support to Sudanese dissidents. Such Libyan pressure strengthens the prospect that Nimeiri eventually will cut a deal with Qadhafi to test the Libyan leader's professed willingness to negotiate a reduction in sup- port for each other's dissidents. An effective invasion of Sudan is probably beyond Qadhafi's ability, espe- cially as a sizable number of his limited forces are tied up in Chad. 51. Tunisia.. While Qadhafi is able to contribute to internal turmoil and instability in Tunisia. as well as 16 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Ln; South Pacific Ocean Miller Cylindrical Projection Scale 1:85,000,000 ..1 0 ,THE BAHAMAS CUBA ._, _.wI HAITI ,. //'BELIZE JAMAICA ~ F~ -HONDURAS GUATEMAL_A-,4ip NICARAGUA EL SALVADOR PANAMA COSTA RICA ECUADOR TY, ~~qq OMINICAN ST. CHRISTOPHER III NEVIS 3 ANTIGGA AND 9I,ABUO.V LIT. LUCIA St. VINCENT AND \' BARBADOS TOE GRExAOIxES.~. GRENADA ).J 1-~g TRINIDAD AND iD8AG0 GUYANA ~ VENEZUELA _?1 SURINA --\FrOn ch Guiana (FR.) PERU fURU CHILE, - ARGENTINA Greenland (DEN.) North Atlantic Ocean .1 ICELAN~D/T 4`4.'y.rV THE GAMBIAp GUINEA-BISSAU South Atlantic Ocean C~5 -TUNITrED IREWND INGDD/SLA ~ti5~ w FRANCE MONA MOROCC sf Tho United Stales Government has not recognised the incorporation of Estonia. Wtvia. and Lithuania into the Soviet Union Other boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Svalbard (NOR.) ~ COAS lt.L /A LIBERIA TOGO' %., AMER 0 SAO TOME- I ANo PRINCIPE ti, f GABON SWEDE DENMaRt4 TH ~r IG.O.R POLAND LIECN. W AUS MUN. GREECE- ', MALTA L TUNISIA SOU CA AFRICA ANGOLA \`Namibia I LGARIA CYPRUS,/ LEBANO IRWANDO BURUNDI ROAN UGANDA I/ KENYA SWAZILAND L/ SOUTH O yJ" AFRICA L SOTHO KUWAIT 1 /B~RAINTOMAN UGOS Libyan support for insurgent or terrorist groups Libyan meddling (financial support to political opposition or leftist politicians) IRAN MO'AMBIQUE j~ MADAGASCAR ~~w= INDIA SOVIET UNION SRI LANKA Indian C.A.R. -Central African Republic F.R.G. -Federal Republic of Germany. G.D.R. -German Democratic Republic P.D.R.Y.-People's Democratic Republic of Yemen U.A.E. -United Arab Emirates Y.A.R. -Yemen Arab Republic CAMBOOI 'Res. ? Hong Kong UK) (PORT. tl b4~ QyW ,dI I~1D.ON.ESIA.;a A W w- ~, ~ .,,-.,ice ~`?~ r\r DS., KOREA JAPAN PAPUA 'R SOLOMON EW'G\UI~NEA., \ISLANDS N Ln 6? VANUATU: New Caledonia (FR.) North Pacific Ocean NEW ZEALAND,, a'. FIJI? . U.S. Qadhafi's Global Activities, 1980-85 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 9Y1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 SECRET Sudan, he is unable to ensure the outcome of any power contest. Qadhafi will almost certainly exploit political uncertainties when 82-year-old President Bourguiba dies. If Bourguiba dies soon, Qadhafi prob- ably will confine himself initially to throwing his political support behind a contender in an attempt to manipulate the succession process. Libya also probably will step up efforts to expand its clandestine network in Tunisia, and to infiltrate dissident Tunisians cur- rently being trained in Libya. Over time, Bourguiba's demise and the succession struggle will provide Qa- dhafi with opportunities to fan domestic unrest, espe- cially if the new government fails to ease growing popular discontent. Qadhafi's willingness to send his armed forces into Tunisia will depend on his assess- ment of the government's prospects as well as the chances of French, US, and Algerian military inter- ,vention to stop him.. 52. As is the case with Sudan, Qadhafi is likely to employ. a two-tiered approach with Tunisia-threats alternating with or accompanied by efforts at co- option-in order to achieve his ends. 53. Morocco. Despite the current union of their two states, Qadhafi has long sought the fall of Moroc- can King Hassan because he is a moderate pro-US leader. The union provides growing opportunities to increase Libyan influence within Morocco, which Qadhafi will try to exploit when the union ultimately founders and* he turns sharply on Hassan. The eco- nomic benefits for Morocco have been slow to come so far, and the union may become a factor contributing to domestic difficulties there. 54. Other Arab States. Qadhafi also is interested in subverting Egypt and Algeria, but he realizes that their military superiority limits what he, can do. He is interested in toppling the leaders of Jordan and Iraq, but distance and lack of assets seriously constrain his efforts, barring the persistent threat of assassination by Libyan operatives. during their travels abroad. Qadhafi almost certainly will again attempt to embarrass or intimidate Cairo by conducting operations similar to the covert mining of the Red Sea. Targets in Sub-Saharan Africa 55. The situation in Chad risks becoming a com- plete Libyan victory, and Tripoli shows every indica- tion of. occupying the northern part of the country indefinitely. Libyan troops there will continue to pose a serious threat to President Habre, , particularly if Paris falters in its resolve to counter any future Libyan military offensive southward. In addition, Qadhafi's leverage over Chadian dissidents ensures a Libyan role in French efforts to engineer a power-sharing arrange- ment that reconciles Habre, a northerner, with leaders from southern Chad. Habre's heavyhanded efforts to suppress dissident activity in the south will continue to spur resentment there and create a climate conducive to Libyan meddling. 56. Libya also has prospects for contributing to destabilization elsewhere among black African states. These states-where frequently only a few dollars will buy loyalty, or where a few guns can make a major difference-provide considerable scope for expansion of Libyan influence. But even here Qadhafi has little ability to dictate the outcome of a power struggle. 57. Pro-Western Niger is potentially the most vul- nerable Libyan target because of military weakness and the fragility of its economic, political, and social structures. Also, the country's remote northern re- gion-which has rich uranium resources-is easily within reach of conventional Libyan military forces. Moreover, two airfields currently under construction in extreme southwestern Libya-one of which strad- dles the border-probably are intended in part to strengthen Libyan military capabilities against Niger. An extensive Libyan military intervention against Niger would be likely to await a resolution of Libyan .efforts to install a pro-Libyan regime in N'Djamena unless instability in Niamey presented Qadhafi with .new opportunities. Qadhafi will continue to rely main- ly. on subversion and sabotage to create a climate suitable to the installation. of a pro-Libyan. regime in Niamey. 58. Zaire has given political and military support to Chadian President Habre, and this, along with its decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel in 1982, has made President Mobutu another one of Qadhafi's principal targets. Tripoli has increased sup- port for Zairian dissidents and has been implicated in several terrorist incidents in Kinshasa over the past year, but the weak and divided opposition organiza- tions have little chance of toppling Mobutu in the near term. 59. Other African regimes with close ties to France and the United States will become more susceptible to Libyan blandishments and will attempt to forestall Libyan meddling by placating Qadhafi if government authority erodes. Qadhafi's dispatching of his Foreign Minister and other envoys to various Francophone African capitals indicates that Tripoli is anxious to exploit African doubts about French security commit- ments since the French pullout from Chad. 19 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET Targets in Central America and the Caribbean 60. Central American governments and groups are wary of Qadhafi, but not averse to accepting his largess. US involvement in Central America makes operations in the US "backyard" of particular interest to Qadhafi, who seeks to strike back at the United States for building close ties to Libya's neighbors. Libyan involvement in Central America is, however, also motivated by Qadhafi's desire to demonstrate his leadership ability to the Third World. 61. Continued Libyan political, military, and eco- nomic support to Nicaragua will help prop up the regime and will indirectly enhance the Sandinistas' ability to subvert neighboring states. Qadhafi is also funding leftist opposition political groups in countries such as Dominica, St. Lucia, and Costa Rica. Al- though Libya probably will try to strengthen revolu- tionary movements elsewhere in the region and pro- mote more militant activities against the United States, its prospects will continue to be constrained by dis- tance, cultural differences, a longstanding suspicion of Qadhafi by Latin American leaders, rivalry with Cuba, and a bias against terrorist activities on the part of many Caribbean leftists. Targets in Asia and Oceania 62. The difficulties Libya faces in expanding its influence in this region are similar to those in Latin America. Qadhafi will readily support insurgents in such pro-Western nations as the Philippines and the French territory of New Caledonia if he calculates that such support will weaken their ties to Washington or Paris. Qadhafi backed a coup plot against Bangla- desh last year and can be expected to do so again if the opportunity arises. Libya will probably want to pro- vide limited symbolic support to the Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka. Qadhafi's Prospects 63. Despite his overall failure to achieve interna- tional acceptability, Qadhafi has in recent months achieved a series of foreign policy successes that have reduced his international isolation and bolstered his confidence. They include: - Union with Morocco, a US ally. - Apparently expanding intelligence ties to Greece, designed at least in part to facilitate Qadhafi's efforts to suppress Libyan dissident activity cen- tered in that country. - Improved military relations with Greece and Turkey, members of NATO. - A defense treaty with Malta. - Manipulation of France and continued occupa- tion of northern Chad. - Enhanced economic dealings and increasing mil- itary cooperation with Italy. - An enhanced diplomatic and military advisory relationship with Central American governments and groups, although Qadhafi has been largely prevented from shipping major arms into the region. Qadhafi is particularly gratified because several of these breakthroughs involve European countries and can be identified as at US expense. Qadhafi subse- quently is feeling confident and successful in his efforts to break out of US political and financial encirclement and he will continue to use economic incentives to improve his ties to Europe. Qadhafi may also in coming months be able to use improving economic relations with Europe to defuse some of the domestic unhappiness with his policies. 64. A major objective of Qadhafi's efforts to im- prove ties to Europe will be access to Western military equipment and spare parts for embargoed US materi- als. We are particularly concerned about Libya's apparently expanding intelligence ties to Greece, and about Libya's enhanced military relations with Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Libyan defense agreement with Malta bears watching, especially if it results in a sustained Libyan naval and air presence. 65. European states that have moved to improve ties to Libya have done so mainly for economic reasons. Continued financial dealings with Libya by American companies have raised serious questions from several quarters about the sincerity of US policy toward Libya. The French-perhaps largely for rea-, sons relating to their own embarrassment over Chad- and the Egyptians have publicly emphasized the economic ambiguity in the US relationship with Libya. 66. Qadhafi today is at least as dangerous as he has ever been and is, in some ways, a more formidable actor on the international stage. His primary long- range goal-to become the preeminent leader of the Arab world-continues to elude him. The passage of time has not diminished his urgency to accomplish his goals, despite his having faced the reality that he will not achieve them quickly. With the years, Qadhafi has become more calculating in blending political skills 20 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET with tactics of terrorism and intimidation as he shrewdly exploits opportunities. Recently Qadhafi has scored some significant successes that lead him to believe he is winning greater international acceptance. Although he will not be satisfied until he achieves his ultimate objectives, these successes have bolstered his self-confidence and spur him on to further-and potentially more dangerous-adventurism. Negative Prospects 67. Although Qadhafi has managed to attract atten- tion, he has in the process alienated Libya's neighbors and lost most of his credibility in the developing world. In coming months, he may be able further to reduce his economic and even political isolation, but he will not significantly increase his role as an interna- tional leader. 68. Arab and African leaders pay lipservice to Qadhafi's position as a brother leader. But they fear his ambitions, do not trust him, and will hesitate to place themselves in positions of dependence upon him. Within the Libyan-Moroccan union, Hassan does not trust Qadhafi, seeks only to use him, and will ultimate- ly face Qadhafi's wrath when Moroccan perfidy is uncovered. With the exception of Chad and Sudan, Arab and African suspicions and vigilance will tend to vitiate Qadhafi's efforts to overthrow or undermine any of Libya's neighbors. 69. Nor will Qadhafi succeed in wiping out the Libyan dissidents. The short-lived reign of terror after an abortive coup attempt in May 1984 was a severe blow to the oppositionist groups. They remain active, however, and show signs of recovery and continuing ability to operate. Of particular importance is growing support for the Libyan exiles by Arab governments. What Could Blunt Qadhafi's Efforts 70. Essentially, Qadhafi is not controllable. He is independent of real restraint from his close advisers. Nor do ties to moderate states serve to change his behavior. A fundamental belief in the righteousness of his cause prevents compromise, and his recent foreign policy successes encourage him to stay the course. Increased political and economic pressure have not served to permanently modify his behavior. Although he may temporarily back down under threat of strong retaliation, opposition enhances his feelings of self- importance and increases his determination to take revenge. 71. Qadhafi does have a number of limitations and weaknesses that serve to ensure that his desires exceed his reach: - Lack of appeal. Qadhafi's fanciful economic and political theories do not have much appeal in the developing world. The Third World respects success, and Libya-despite its oil wealth and postrevolution improvements in living stan- dards-has not been able to eliminate shortages of consumer goods, prevent a hemorrhage of intellectuals from the country, keep peace with its neighbors, or achieve international respectability. - Economic constraints. Qadhafi has been notori- ously faithless in carrying through on promises of financial assistance-behavior that has contribut- ed to his loss of credibility in the developing world. Libya's post-1981 economic difficulties have not significantly weakened Qadhafi's ability or inclination to meddle in other states' internal affairs or to engage in terrorist operations. But the need for austerity has caused him to reduce the number of Libyan people's bureaus during this past year, with a consequent reduction in bases from which to spread Libyan influence and subversion. Continued financial difficulties could accelerate this trend and further restrict his ability to purchase allies and finance terrorist operations. Increased Arab opposition. The Arabs have sought for years to manage Qadhafi by maintain- ing contact with him. They have periodically tried cooperation, cajolery- and, and, in the case of Egypt and Algeria, military pressure. Such tactics have not served to change Qadhafi's behavior over the long term but have on occasion tempo- rarily moderated it. Instead, highly visible acts of internationally unacceptable behavior-many of them directly against Arab interests-appear in- tegral to Qadhafi's agenda. 72. Arab concern has been increased by Qadhafi's failure to withdraw from Chad, his continuing efforts to destabilize Sudan, and his attempts to position himself to take advantage of internal instability in Tunisia when Bourguiba goes. During the past year, several Arab states-including Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Iraq-and Yasir Arafat's faction of the PLO have significantly increased aid to the Libyan dissident groups. 73. There are indications that perception of a com- mon Libyan threat is drawing Egypt and Algeria together. Despite ideological and other differences, 21 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 SECRET Algeria and Egypt are jointly concerned over the threat Qadhafi poses to regional tranquillity and secu- rity. The Libyan-Moroccan union is seen by Algeria as directed specifically against its own interests and security. Cairo and Algiers probably are discussing the possibility of coordinating support for. the Libyan oppositionists. Qadhafi's Opponents: Limited Strength but Growing Support 74. Qadhafi's opponents still pose no major direct threat to his tenure, although they clearly worry him and heighten strains within Libya. Qadhafi's increased preoccupation with Libyan oppositionists has acceler- ated rather than diminished his aggressive behavior. The opposition groups remain factionalized and large- ly unable.to operate inside Libya. They probably have made some progress in rebuilding the limited capabili- ty they had before Qadhafi's crackdown against do- mestic dissidents last year. 75. There are, moreover, some indications of con- tact between internal dissidents, including persons in the Libyan military, and external groups.. Augmented Arab support for the dissidents will at least marginally strengthen the dissidents' operational ability against Qadhafi, but could also contribute to disunity and rivalry. Improved dissident operational strength could contribute as well to an increasing cycle of attack and counterattack between Libyan exiles and Qadhafi's agents in Europe. In coming months we expect Qadha- fi to increase his attacks both on his opponents and on the personnel and installations of those countries that assist and harbor them. 76. But opposition to Qadhafi is the only common denominator among the more than 20 opposition groups-several of which represent only a handful of people-whose philosophies range from Marxist to Islamic fundamentalist to rightwing monarchist. We see no signs that increased internal opposition to Qadhafi has translated into support for Libyan person- alities in exile or resulted in increased exile unity. Should Qadhafi depart from the scene, returning exiles-most of them former diplomats, teachers, or other professionals and intellectuals-would be unlike- ly to persuade the military to relinquish power. Inept Operatives 77. Qadhafi's efforts to eliminate his opponents are blunted by the general ineptitude of most of his agents and the faultiness of his intelligence. Libyan dissidents assassinated abroad have usually been rank and file, not the leaders Qadhafi fears most. He has targeted several leaders of other Arab states, but has failed to assassinate any. Implications for the United States 78. Qadhafi's more innovative use of his traditional- ly aggressive tactics makes him a more dangerous opponent of US interests and policies. Increased West European opposition to US efforts to impose economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Tripoli increases the possibility that Libya will gain greater access to sophisticated Western arms and technology. Growing cooperation between Tripoli and some West European governments, as well as between Libya and Morocco, also may result in some compromise of intelligence supplied by the United States to its NATO and other allies. 79. Qadhafi's success so far in countering US policy toward Libya in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the Arab world will encourage 'him to take greater risks in his efforts against US interests. He may become more willing to back terrorist operations against US personnel or facilities or to order his armed forces to respond to what he deems "provocative" US military activities near Libya. In any military confron- tation with Washington, Qadhafi would cast-Libya as a small Arab country victimized by a superpower in an attempt to weaken US influence in the Arab world. Such a posture would meet with very little practical response in Arab capitals, however, except from radi- cal comrades-in-arms. 80. The increasing inclination by Qadhafi to imple- ment operations that cause an international uproar and project an image of Libyan power impacts on the credibility of US economic and security commitments. Qadhafi's actions are likely to prompt persistent re- quests by US friends in Africa and the Arab world for immediate military and economic assistance to lessen their vulnerability to Libyan pressure. Moderate lead- ers, particularly Arabs, risk discrediting themselves with repeated and desperate calls for US support. By demonstrating their dependence on the United. States, they highlight the failure of their economic and security policies and may promote popular opposition to close US ties. Under such circumstances, continued Libyan pressure, mixed with blandishments, could prompt some pro-US governments-such as Sudan's and Tunisia's-to adopt a more nonaligned posture. 81. Qadhafi's continued disregard for international law and convention-reneging on international agree- ments, abusing diplomatic privilege for terrorist pur- 22 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 poses, and blatant use of violence against opponents- tween US rhetorical criticism of Qadhafi's behavior undermines international norms of behavior and may, and actual US policy toward him also undermines US over time, encourage other states or groups to do credibility on this issue. likewise. The international perception of a gap be- 23 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 ANNEX Chronology of Libyan Troublemaking, 1980-84 2 1984 November Egypt: President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakush have been arrested and forced to send fake pictures to the Libyan embassy in Malta showing Ba- kush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources then claim Bakush had been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution." September Italy: A Libyan exile found gagged and strangled in a Rome hotel had been the subject of Libyan requests for deportation to Libya. Bangladesh: Libyan-sponsored coup plotters arrested in Bangladesh. August United One of six Libyans awaiting trial for March 1983 Kingdom: bomb attacks in London found shot to death in a London apartment. The victim may` have been si- lenced by the Libyan Government. Belgium: A bomb wrecks a car parked in front of the Zairian Embassy in Brussels. July Belgium: A bomb exploded in the Brussels office of Air Zaire. Red Sea: Red Sea and Gulf of Suez mined by Libya, damaging 18 merchant ships of varying nationalities. Greece: Two Libyan students found murdered in their apart- ment had .been beaten, gagged, and ..strangled before being shot twice in the back, in a crime reminiscent of Libyan killings of anti-Qadhafi students in 1980-81. June Greece: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan editor of an-Ara b newspaper in Athens killed by two men on a motorbike. A Libyan-born citizen known to distribute anti-Qa- dhafi literature at his store shot by a Libyan employee of Libyan Arab Airlines. May Libya: Norwegian merchant ship seized in Tripoli, crew accused of spying; released only after fine paid and one crewmember had died while being interrogated. Jana, the official Libyan news agency, announces "the Libyan masses have decided to form suicide comman- dos to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are and liquidate them physically." 2 The incidents in this chronology are believed to have been sponsored by the Libyan Government, although firm evidence is not available for some of the incidents, particularly bombings. Attacks against the Libyan Government by its opponents are not included. 25 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 April United A bomb hidden in an unclaimed suitcase probably Kingdom: unloaded from a Libyan airliner explodes at London's Heathrow Airport, injuring 25. British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhafi dem- onstrators wounded by gunfire from Libyan People's Bureau in London. After a siege, British authorities find weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy. Libya: A number of British subjects in Libya arrested on trumped-up charges as hostages in order to pressure British Government during siege of Libyan People's Bureau in London. March Zaire: Two bombs damage government buildings in Kinsha- sa. Two killed, six wounded. Third bomb defused. Central French airliner bombed in Bangui; 25 passengers African injured. Republic: United Four bombs explode in London and Manchester near Kingdom: homes of Libyan exiles or at businesses frequented by Sudan: A Libyan TU-22 bomber strikes Omdurman, site of a radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi oppositionists. February Libya: Following annual Libyan General People's Congress, the Libyan Revolutionary Committees announce that all Libyan exiles must return to Libya or face "the death penalty." Demostrators set fire to the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli, destroying building but causing no personal injuries. Congo: Chadian dissidents ready to negotiate with Govern- ment of Chad threatened in Brazzaville. January Central Attempted bombings of a French school and French African business in Bangui. Republic: them. Over 25 people injured. Three other bombs .defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested. Zaire: Bomb damages French hotel in Kinshasa. Suitcase from Soviet airliner blows up at Kinshasa airport. 1983 September Italy: August Upper Volta (now Burkina): Four Libyans claiming to be seamen are arrested in Rome : while following the US Ambassador's motor- cade. Libya gives material support to coup leaders. 26 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 July Chad: Libya invades Chad for the second time. Occupation continues into 1985. June West Eight resident Libyan students, all members of an Germany: anti-Qadhafi group, complain Libyan agents are ha- rassing and threatening them. February Libya: General People's Congress warns all Libyans in exile to return home or face "the anger of the Libyan people." 1981 November Sudan: Several bombs explode near government installations in Khartoum. October Sudan: Planned assassination of visiting Chadian official, Hus- sein Habre, fails when hit team surrenders. Egypt: Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a plane coming from Libya via Malta. August Libya: Two Libyan.SU-22s that fired at US Navy F-14s over Gulf of Sidra shot down. June Sudan: Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khar- toum. February Italy: Libyan gunmen open fire on passengers arriving at Rome's airport on a flight from Algiers. Prominent anti-Qadhafi exile was the target. November United Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student brutally murdered in Kingdom: London. Two children of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned with peanuts containing thallium. October Chad: Occupying Libyan forces attempt to force a Libyan- 1980- Chadian union. November 1981 October The Gambia: Libyan subversion causes break in relations. Senegalese troops intervene under a mutual defense treaty. United States: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student shot in Fort Collins, Colorado, losing his right eye. The Libyan-hired assail- ant, an ex-Green Beret US citizen, is in jail. This is the only known instance of a Libyan operation successful- ly carried out inside the United States. 27 SECRET` Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 June Italy: Anti-Qadhafi exile wounded in Rome. Libyan exile killed in Milan within hours after expira- tion of a deadline set by Qadhafi for all Libyan exiles to return home. May Italy: Libyan exile shot at: in Rome. The arrested Libyan gunman says he was sent by Libya "to,kill an enemy of the people." Libyan businessman found strangled to death in Rome. Libyan exile killed in Rome by two gunshots in the head. Greece: Libyan exile killed in Athens, his throat slit. West Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn. Germany: April United Libyan lawyer shot and killed in London. Kingdom: Two gunmen kill an anti-Qadhafi Libyan journalist. Italy: Well-known Libyan businessman killed. The arrested assassin says the victim was an enemy of Qadhafi. February Libya: Tunisian.and French Embassies in Tripoli sacked and burned by a mob while Libyan authorities stand by idly. 28 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to- know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: a. Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of Energy h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the Treasury k. The Deputy Director for Intelligence for any other Department or Agency 2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence. 3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. 4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4 Secret Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100310001-4

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